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ABSTRACT
Most states tax the value of residents’ motor vehi-
cles. In recent political debates over the future of
these levies, the relative effects of these taxes on dif-
ferent socioeconomic groups have been a promi-
nent question. By linking data from the Nationwide
Personal Transportation Survey with estimates of
vehicle values from consumer vehicle pricing
guides, the socioeconomic and demographic inci-
dence of California’s Vehicle License Fee is exam-
ined. After the effects of state and federal income
tax deductions are taken into account, the fee is
found to be as regressive as the state’s sales tax.
INTRODUCTION
Value-based assessments on motor vehicles, includ-
ing personal property taxes and vehicle license fees,
have emerged as a key focus of state-level tax-cut-
ting efforts nationwide. This paper examines the
incidence of one such tax, California’s Vehicle
License Fee (VLF), which has been assessed on all
privately owned, registered vehicles in the state
since 1935. It is a uniform, statewide property tax
that was set, until recently, at 2% of a vehicle’s
value, based on its most recent purchase price and
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a fixed depreciation schedule. If the VLF had re-
mained unchanged, it would have raised approxi-
mately $3.9 billion in the 1998–99 fiscal year
(State of California 1998).
Around the nation, concerns about equity have
been at the center of many of the debates surround-
ing these tax cuts. In California, where a budgetary
surplus led legislators to reduce the VLF by 25% last
year, little information was available on how the ben-
efits of this action would be distributed across the
population. Because of this gap, the Senate Office of
Research asked the California Policy Research
Center and the Institute of Urban and Regional
Development at the University of California,
Berkeley, to prepare an analysis of the incidence of
the fee. This paper grew from that research effort.
The VLF and its equivalents elsewhere pose
interesting questions because they are distinct from
other transportation-related taxes. Unlike many
other taxes, the VLF bears no relationship to costs
or benefits from use of the transportation system.
Some transportation-related taxes seek to recap-
ture some external benefits by taxing actual system
use (crossing a bridge or tunnel, consuming gaso-
line) or by taxing the wealth derived from the sys-
tem (real property, since local streets confer the
property with value by providing access). Other
taxes are assessed in some rough proportion to the
impacts that a user places on the system, simply by
participating (e.g., registering a vehicle) or by im-
posing specific externalities (e.g., causing road
damage from excessive axle weight, driving during
rush hour, etc.).
The VLF does not fit any of these categories;
instead, it is loosely related to individuals’ ability-
to-pay. But unlike other levies that rely on current
expenditures to reveal ability-to-pay, such as the
vehicle sales/transfer tax or the general sales tax,
the VLF targets a portion of wealth that is derived
from past expenditures.
Another unique characteristic is that the VLF is
typically not earmarked for transportation-related
expenditures. Because of its origins as a local tax
on personal property, it continues to be used as a
source of local general revenue. As a result, it is not
easy to determine how VLF revenues are spent. For
this reason, we focus more narrowly on the inci-
dence of the tax burden imposed by the VLF.
Finally, because it is not based directly on expen-
ditures in the marketplace or on easily observable
characteristics of vehicles or travelers, the VLF is
difficult to measure. As a result, the implications of
this tax are not as well understood as those of other
taxes, despite the tax’s magnitude in many states.
METHODOLOGY
The methodology and assumptions used in this
research are outlined briefly here and described in
detail in the appendix. Before the 1998 tax cut, the
California Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV)
charged the VLF annually for each vehicle, using
the following formula (equation 1) and a deprecia-
tion schedule (table 1):
VLF = 0.02  initial vehicle value (rounded to
nearest $100)  depreciation factor (1)
Therefore, two pieces of information on each
household vehicle are needed to calculate the VLF:
1) purchase price (or reported value) of the vehicle
when it was first registered by the current owner,
and 2) initial year of vehicle registration by the cur-
rent owner, which determines the depreciation fac-
tor. While the DMV collects the VLF, it does not
gather data on household income or demographic
characteristics needed for an incidence analysis.
Moreover, raw DMV data on vehicle registrations
were not available for this study.
Instead, we relied on an alternative source, the
1995 Nationwide Personal Transportation Survey
(NPTS). The NPTS sample includes 2,262 house-
holds in California, which collectively have over
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TABLE 1   VLF Depreciation Schedule
Year of Depreciation
registration factor (autos)
1 100%
2 90%
3 80%
4 70%
5 60%
6 50%
7 40%
8 30%
9 25%
10 20%
11 and later 15%
4,200 vehicles available for regular use. Using the
NPTS required a number of assumptions for initial
value and year of acquisition. Where the acquisi-
tion year of vehicles was not known, we assumed
that: 1) new vehicles were acquired the same year
as the model year and 2) used vehicles were
acquired halfway between the model year and the
year of the survey. Based on these estimated pur-
chase dates, plus vehicle make and model informa-
tion from the NPTS, we estimated vehicle purchase
values using standard vehicle pricing guides. 
FINDINGS
How Do VLF Payments Vary with Income?
In 1996, the average California household paid
$247 in VLFs. Total household VLFs ranged from
$55 for households with annual incomes under
$10,000 to $599 for households with incomes over
$100,0001 (see figure 1). The 25% reduction in the
VLF will save the households with the lowest
incomes an average of $13.75. The average house-
hold will save $61.75, and households in the high-
est income group will save nearly $150.
Approximately 5.7% of California households
do not own or lease any vehicles and, therefore, do
not pay the VLF. These households will not benefit
from the tax cut, unless they purchase or lease a
vehicle in the future. More than one-third of
households with incomes less than $10,000 do not
own or lease vehicles; excluding these households,
the average total VLF payment for this income
group is $88 per year. 
VLFs increase with income because wealthier
households tend to own more vehicles, and the
vehicles they own tend to be newer and more
expensive (see figure 2). The average number of
vehicles per household levels off at about 2.25 for
the highest income households, but the value of
each vehicle continues to increase.
Figure 3 shows the range of total VLF paid by
different income groups. The median is the 50th
percentile: half of the households pay more than
that amount, and half pay less. The 90th percentile
line represents the total VLF below which 90% of
the households in an income category pay; 10% of
the households in that income category pay more
than that amount. Similarly, the 10th percentile
line represents the amount of VLF below which the
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1 In figure 1, the total VLF appears to rise sharply for
households in the highest two income categories.
However, note that the highest two income categories
($80,000–99,999 and $100,000 and above) are broader
than the other categories, which are in $10,000 incre-
ments. This difference in increment is due to the data
source and makes the increase in the VLF appear sharper
than it should.
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FIGURE 1   Average Total Household Vehicle License Fees
lowest 10% of households in that income group
pay. Therefore, 80% of the households pay a total
VLF within the range between the 10th and 90th
percentile lines. 
Is the VLF Equitable?
Discussions of equity in transportation finance
usually focus on measures of horizontal equity
(fairness across different user groups, demograph-
ic groups, or geographic areas) and/or vertical
equity (fairness across different income groups). In
both cases, the net benefits to each group are of
primary importance. However, because the rev-
enues from the VLF tend not to be targeted for
transportation expenditures, it is not possible to
compare the costs and benefits. We, therefore,
focus exclusively on the cost side of the equation.
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On average, the California VLF consumes
0.61% of annual household income. The VLF’s
impact relative to household income declines as
income rises (see figure 4), indicating that this is a
regressive tax. Overall, the poorest households pay
an average of 1.05% of their income in VLFs; this
value rises to 1.68% for low-income households
that own vehicles. For vehicle-owning households
with incomes less than $10,000, the 25% cut in the
VLF will be most noticeable: on average, it will
save them nearly 0.5% of their annual incomes.
The regressivity of the VLF is heightened when
interactions with other taxes are taken into
account. Households can significantly reduce
their net VLF payments by deducting personal
property taxes (including the VLF) from their tax-
able income. The vast majority of the benefits of
this tax rule accrue to upper income households
(see figure 5). There are two reasons for this:
higher income taxpayers tend to be more likely to
itemize deductions, and they benefit more from
doing so, since they have higher marginal tax
rates. Most families (84%) do not claim a deduc-
tion for the VLF. However, including the majori-
ty who do not claim this deduction, the average
household at the highest income levels wins back
one-quarter of its VLF bill when it pays income
taxes. The average household at the lowest
income levels saves only 2% of its VLF payments
through tax deductions.
A different perspective on equity can be seen by
comparing the percentage of the total fee paid by a
certain group with the percentage of the total pop-
ulation that group represents. This analysis is
shown in figure 6. Households with incomes below
$10,000 pay under 2% of the total VLF collected,
while they represent over 7% of the households in
California. The transition appears to occur near
$40,000: households above this level pay 55.7% of
the VLF, while representing only 39.8% of the
population. Any proportional reduction in the tax
rate will have a greater absolute benefit for these
higher income households.
How Does the VLF Compare with Other Taxes?
As discussed earlier, license fees based on vehicle
values are only one of many different taxes and
fees that vehicle owners pay. Other types of assess-
ments include registration fees, vehicle sales and
transfer taxes, gasoline taxes, wheel taxes, weight
taxes, title fees, emissions charges, and special
interest or personalized license plate fees.
Some predictions can be made concerning the
relative regressivity of various tax options. In gen-
eral, taxes that target discretionary expenditures
will be less regressive than those that target essen-
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tial expenditures. In California, the regressivity of
the sales tax is alleviated somewhat because the
least discretionary expenditures—food, utilities,
and some health-related products and services—
are exempt from the tax. This is not the case for
the gas tax, which remains highly regressive
because a high proportion of the state’s poor pop-
ulation is automobile dependent.
The VLF is expected to be less regressive than
these other taxes. The choice of vehicle is highly
discretionary: the age, value, and number of vehi-
cles a family owns is strongly influenced by family
income. However, unlike sales and gasoline taxes,
the VLF is deductible from state and federal
income taxes, a policy that disproportionately ben-
efits higher income groups.
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FIGURE 6   Percentage of Households and Aggregate VLF Paid
One way of comparing the relative incidence of
different taxes is to plot the aggregate percentage
of the tax burden against the aggregate percentage
of total income. Figure 7 compares the VLF results
with data on the incidence of gasoline and sales
taxes (Citizens for Tax Justice 1996). The results
confirm the expectations described above: the gas
tax is the most regressive, followed by the sales tax,
and ultimately by the VLF. After the tax deductibil-
ity of the VLF is taken into account, the VLF is
extremely similar to the sales tax.
These relationships can be quantified using the
S-Index (Suits 1977), which relates the area under
the tax incidence curve to the area under the line
representing income neutrality. The S-Index ranges
from +1 (extreme progressivity) to –1 (extreme
regressivity), with a value of 0 indicating a tax bur-
den equitably distributed across incomes. The
index has been applied before to the analysis of
transportation taxes, based on data from the
Consumer Expenditures Survey (Rock 1982,
1990). It has also been used to evaluate the inci-
dence of vehicle emissions taxes, based on data
from the NPTS (Walls and Hanson 1996).
The relative regressivity of various transporta-
tion-related taxes and fees in California is shown in
figure 8.2 Values for VLFs, before and after tax
deductions, are based on data produced in this
study. Values for the flat registration and driver’s
license fees were derived from the NPTS database
by multiplying a flat fee by the number of vehicles
and the number of drivers in each household,
respectively. Values for the sales and gasoline taxes
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                    Various Taxes and Fees
2 Household income quintiles were used to calculate the
values in figure 8. Because the tax incidence curve is con-
cave, the use of coarse income categories underestimates
the area under the curve and thus understates the actual
regressivity of the taxes. Although richer detail is available
for each of the taxes examined here, the income ranges are
not compatible across data sources, and quintiles must be
used to ensure comparability.
were derived from a study that estimated the dis-
tribution of payments of these taxes in California
in 1995, based on the Consumer Expenditures
Survey (Citizens for Tax Justice 1996). Values for
the vehicle sales/transfer tax were derived directly
from 1994/95 Consumer Expenditures Survey data
for the western United States (USDOL 1994–
1995).
Of these tax options, the vehicle sales/transfer
tax is the only one more progressive than the VLF.
This is consistent with the theoretical predictions
outlined above since households have greater dis-
cretion in their decisions to purchase vehicles than
they do in their decisions to own vehicles. Lower
income households tend to make these purchases
less frequently because they hold on to their cars
for longer periods of time.
How Do VLF Payments Vary with
Household Location and Demographics?
The average household VLF was compared across
several demographic variables, including race and
ethnicity, family life cycle category, age, and loca-
tion. For example, figure 9 displays the results of
an analysis of how the VLF as a percentage of
household income varies by family life cycle cate-
gory. There are three noteworthy patterns in these
results: 1) households comprised of two or more
adults pay greater VLF in comparison to their
incomes, 2) nonretired households without chil-
dren pay more (probably because they are able to
devote more of their resources to automobile pur-
chases), and 3) households with older teens pay
more (probably because their ownership of an
extra car is not fully compensated by the salary
that a teenager can earn). A key question is
whether the VLF places a disproportionate eco-
nomic burden on retirees, given their relatively low
fixed incomes. Figure 9 suggests that retired fami-
lies do not bear higher costs relative to their means.
Table 2 shows the total household VLF for
households of different races and Hispanic ethnic-
ity, along with factors that directly influence VLF
payments: the number of vehicles per household,
the initial value of the vehicle, and the number of
years household vehicles were registered.3 Asian
households pay the highest average VLF, while
African-American and Hispanic households pay a
lower average VLF. Households in the San
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FIGURE 9   VLF as a Percentage of Household Income, by Life Cycle Category
3 Household race is based on the race of the “reference
person” for the survey. The reference person is the person
or one of the persons who owns or rents the home. 
Francisco metropolitan statistical area (MSA) pay
the lowest average VLF of the state’s MSAs ($206),
while Orange County MSA residents pay the high-
est ($306), as shown in figure 10. 
The differences in VLF payments by life cycle,
race, and region are of interest to political deci-
sionmakers when evaluating tax-cut proposals.
However, a regression analysis demonstrates that
many of the differences in VLF payments between
households disappear after controlling for income
and the number of vehicles or drivers per house-
hold. Table 3 shows the results of a stepwise, least
squares linear regression model with total house-
hold VLF payments as the dependent variable
(model 1).
As expected, households with higher incomes
and more vehicles pay greater VLFs. Additional
significant variables include white households and
the San Francisco and Oakland MSAs. The signif-
icance of the latter two variables suggests that
urban form or the existence of a regional rail sys-
tem may enable some households to defer expen-
ditures on vehicles. However, as noted at the
bottom of the table, the adjusted r2 for a model
with only income and number of vehicles as inde-
pendent variables is identical to the model with the
additional variables.
Models 2, 3, and 4 employ three different de-
pendent variables: the number of household vehi-
cles, the average initial value of the household
vehicles, and the average length of vehicle registra-
tion in years, respectively. As described earlier,
total household VLF payments were calculated
directly from the initial vehicle value and the length
of registration for each household vehicle, applying
equation 1. Therefore, any relationship between
household characteristics and VLF payments
enters through one or more of the three dependent
variables shown in models 2–4. 
Several factors are significant when estimating
vehicle ownership (model 2). For example, senior
households have fewer vehicles, as do African-
American, Hispanic, and San Francisco house-
holds. However, these additional variables do little
to explain vehicle ownership beyond income and
the number of drivers. The adjusted r2 for the com-
plete model is 0.47, compared with 0.46 for a
reduced model with only income and number of
drivers as variables.
Model 3 shows that, even after accounting for
income, some household characteristics may have
an impact on the purchase price of vehicles. For
example, having more children in a household cor-
relates with lower value cars, indicating that
households with children may divert income from
vehicle purchases to other expenses. Asian house-
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TABLE 2   VLF Payments by Race and Ethnicity
Total VLF per Vehicles per Initial value of Length of vehicle
household household vehicle registration (years)
Asian $297 2.02 $13,500 6.1
White $252 1.85 $12,110 7.0
African-American $210 1.46 $11,970 6.8
Other $227 1.82 $10,290 6.4
Non-Hispanic $257 1.85 $12,410 6.9
Hispanic $205 1.72 $ 9,780 6.4
0 50 100 150
Dollars
200 250 300 350
San Francisco
Oakland
Riverside-
San Bernardino
San Jose
San Diego
Sacramento
Los Angeles-
Long Beach
Orange County
FIGURE 10   Mean Total Household VLF by MSA
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TABLE 3   Ordinary Least Squares Regression Models
Total Number of Average inital Average length of vehicle
Dependent variable household VLF household vehicles vehicle value registration (years)
Relationship to VLF Positive Positive Negative
Constant –18.82 0.32*** 9,219.16*** 6.69***
(–1.32) (6.42) (33.58) (23.16)
Household income ($1,000) 1.55*** 0.002*** 49.5*** –0.006***
(16.74) (6.22) (18.02) (–3.86)
Number of vehicles 116.70*** n.a. 0.53***
(22.42) (4.24)
Number of drivers 0.84*** –0.65***
(33.20) (–3.71)
Number of children –377.30*
(–2.53)
Teen in household (1 = yes) –0.16** –0.52a
(–2.90) (–1.78)
Senior household (average age 70) –0.18** 2.58***
(–3.04) (7.91)
White head of household –30.66*
(–2.50)
Asian head of household 1,418.47*
(2.16)
African-American head of household –0.25**
(–3.42)
Hispanic head of household –0.15** –1,702.05**
(–2.63) (–3.21)
Urbanized area (1 = yes) 0.15**
(3.26)
San Francisco MSA –44.10* –0.14* 1.04**
(–2.14) (–2.00) (2.74)
Oakland MSA –53.06** 0.73*
(–2.96) (2.23)
Orange County MSA 1,834.79**
(3.23)
Los Angeles-Long Beach MSA 895.76*
(2.26)
Adjusted r2 0.38 0.47 0.18 0.07
N 1,807 1,864 1,708 1,708
Adjusted r2 for model with only 0.38 0.09 0.17 0.01
income and number of vehicles as (Income only)
independent variables
Adjusted r2 for model with only 0.29 0.46 0.17 0.02
income and number of drivers as 
independent variables
Key: *p < 0.05;  **p < 0.01;  ***p < 0.001;  ap = 0.075.
Note: Variables excluded from all models—San Jose, Sacramento, San Diego, and Riverside-San Bernardino MSAs, and number of adults.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
holds and households in Los Angeles-Long Beach
and Orange County spend more on vehicles, even
after controlling for income. However, as with
model 2, these additional variables add little to
explain the model beyond the income variable. The
adjusted r2 for the full model is 0.18, compared
with 0.17 for a reduced model with only income
and the number of vehicles or drivers as variables. 
The average length of time a vehicle has been
registered determines the depreciation factor used
to calculate the VLF. The estimated coefficients
(model 4) confirm expectations: a negative rela-
tionship between income and length of registration
and a positive relationship between the number of
vehicles in the household and length of registra-
tion. In addition, senior households hold on to
their vehicles longer, as do residents of the San
Francisco and Oakland MSAs. These last two vari-
ables carry through to total household VLF pay-
ments (model 1), where San Francisco and
Oakland households are seen to pay lower VLFs.
Overall, however, the variables in model 4 explain
less than 10% of the variation in the data (adjust-
ed r2 = 0.07). In contrast to models 1–3, the income
and number of drivers or vehicles variables do not
account for a large portion of the explanatory
power of Model 4.
APPLICABILITY TO OTHER STATES
The taxation of the value of motor vehicles is not
unique to California. At the beginning of 1998, 31
states had some form of value-based vehicle license
fee (Mackey and Rafool 1998). These taxes have
been receiving increased political attention in
recent years. Indiana started the trend, cutting its
vehicle taxes by up to 50%. Soon afterwards,
James Gilmore III was elected Governor of
Virginia, after making elimination of the state’s
“car tax” a centerpiece of his campaign. His victo-
ry helped to catapult the issue into the national
spotlight. By the end of 1998, at least seven other
states (Arizona, California, Nebraska, Rhode
Island, Utah, Virginia, and Washington) had
reduced, restructured, or eliminated their VLFs,
and voters in Kentucky had amended their state
constitution to enable the repeal of their VLFs. In
1999, expanding state budget surpluses are contin-
uing to fuel calls for VLF cuts.
The magnitude of these taxes varies significant-
ly around the country: in 1998, rates ranged from
1% of vehicle value in Iowa to 7.68% of vehicle
value in Rhode Island (Lopez 1998). Sixteen states
set uniform rates, with taxes collected either by
local governments or the state, in which case rev-
enues are usually recycled back to local govern-
ments. Tax rates are set by local jurisdictions in 12
states, and 3 states have hybrid systems. Among
the states with uniform rates, the median annual
tax rate was 1.8% of assessed vehicle value
(Mackey and Rafool 1998). 
The method of determining the value of vehicles
subject to taxation also varies significantly among
the states. Four broad methods are used to estab-
lish these values (Mackey and Rafool 1998):
 Most recent purchase price (California and
Indiana). In these states, a fixed schedule is used
to determine the depreciated value of the vehicle
in subsequent years.
 Manufacturer’s standard retail price (Arizona,
Colorado, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Hampshire, Oklahoma, Washington, and Wyo-
ming). This is also used with a fixed deprecia-
tion schedule.
 Market value, determined by a standard pricing
guide, local assessor, or state commission (Ala-
bama, Alaska, Arkansas, Connecticut, Georgia,
Kansas, Kentucky, Mississippi, Missouri, North
Carolina, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas,
Utah, Virginia, and West Virginia). Depreciation
occurs naturally according to market demand.
 Vehicle vintage (Alaska, Utah).4 This is only a
very rough proxy for vehicle value.
Although each state has a unique method for
assessing its vehicle property taxes, the general
approach outlined in this paper should be applica-
ble elsewhere. In most states, the tax basis is sim-
ply determined by the list price and purchase year,
purchase year alone, or fair market value. These
can be determined from consumer pricing guides,
the method most often used by the state govern-
ments. However, since most transportation surveys
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4 Local jurisdictions in Alaska may choose between assess-
ing a property tax and a vintage-based registration tax.
Utah shifted from a market value-based property tax to a
vintage-based user fee in 1998.
do not provide enough information to pinpoint
either list price or market value exactly, some price
averaging within a model family will still be neces-
sary.
License fees in California and Indiana are more
difficult to model because they are based on actual
purchase price and year, neither of which are
included in the NPTS. As a result, purchase year
and price had to be estimated on the basis of data
that the NPTS provides. We estimated the values of
vehicles purchased new from the list price. The val-
ues of vehicles purchased used were estimated from
the market value in the year they were estimated to
have been purchased (see the appendix for a full
discussion of our methodology).
The limited size of the NPTS sample in any sin-
gle state may be overcome by pooling data from
several nearby states. The finding that regional dif-
ferences were significant in predicting VLF pay-
ments—even after income and number of drivers
were taken into account—suggests that urban
form factors merit particular attention when
assembling a sample.
CONCLUSIONS
Annual taxes or fees based on the value of motor
vehicles are a significant source of income to state
and local governments. They have recently
received a great deal of public attention as states
consider their financial futures and as public offi-
cials and candidates propose major changes in the
ways in which these charges are levied. We found
surprisingly few studies of the mechanisms by
which the VLF is levied, of the uses to which the
proceeds of the fees are put, or of the incidence of
the fees according to spatial, demographic, or eco-
nomic characteristics of the population. 
This study found that VLF payments increase
substantially with income because car ownership
and the value of vehicles both increase with
income. Although upper income citizens of Cali-
fornia pay much more through their VLF pay-
ments than do poorer people, the VLF is a
regressive tax in that it takes from households a
declining proportion of income as income rises.
When the income tax deductibility of the VLF is
taken into consideration, regressivity increases.
The analysis showed some interesting differences
in VLF payments by ethnicity and area of resi-
dence, but most of this variability could be
explained by differences in income and number of
drivers in households.
This study examined the incidence of VLFs levied
against light-duty motor vehicles held by California
households. We did not look into the economic or
fiscal issues related to the VLF paid by California’s
commercial vehicle fleet, which includes medium-
and heavy-duty trucks and light-duty vehicles
owned and operated by fleets, as well as rental vehi-
cles. Since fleet vehicles tend to be newer than vehi-
cles held by households and fees are based on vehicle
value, it is reasonable to conclude that fleet vehicles
are responsible for a higher proportion of VLF rev-
enues than their simple proportion of the fleet
would suggest. Examination of the incidence of fleet
and commercial VLFs would be a logical extension
of this study and would require a substantial invest-
ment in data collection and analysis.
APPENDIX: METHODOLOGY FOR
ESTIMATING VLF INCIDENCE
The evaluation of VLF payments by households
requires a database that combines household
demographic characteristics (income, race, life
cycle characteristics, etc.) with detailed informa-
tion on household vehicles (i.e., purchase year and
purchase price). We used the 1995 NPTS sample of
2,260 households in California (USDOT 1997a,
1997b). For each vehicle in a household, respon-
dents provided information on the vehicle make
(e.g., Ford), model (e.g., Taurus), model year, and
whether the vehicle was acquired new or used. The
survey includes all vehicles that the household
owned or had available for regular use, including
home-based vehicles that are actually owned by
businesses.
Methodology
Two pieces of information on each vehicle owned
by a household are needed to calculate the amount
of VLF paid: 1) purchase price (or reported value)
of the vehicle when it was first registered by the
current owner and 2) initial year of vehicle regis-
tration by the current owner. Purchase price was
not collected in the NPTS survey, and the date of
acquisition was collected only for vehicles acquired
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in the most recent 12 months. Therefore, both
pieces of information had to be estimated.
1. Estimate of Vehicle Purchase Year 
For vehicles purchased during the previous 12
months, the exact month and year of purchase
were recorded. Where this information was not
recorded, the following assumptions were used to
estimate the vehicle purchase year:
 Vehicles acquired new were assumed to have
been acquired in the vehicle’s model year. While
some of these vehicles were purchased when
new models were introduced the previous sum-
mer or fall (e.g., a 1997 car bought in late 1996)
and some new models are purchased the follow-
ing year (e.g., a new 1996 car bought in 1997),
this simplifying assumption is adequate for this
level of analysis.
 Vehicles acquired used. The year of acquisition
was estimated as the midpoint between the
model year and the survey year. That is, a
respondent owning a 1975 vehicle (purchased
used) in the 1995 survey year was assumed to
have purchased it in 1985. 
2. Estimate of Vehicle Purchase Price 
Initial purchase prices were estimated using the Kelley
Blue Book 1975–95 for automobiles, vans, pickup
trucks, and sport utility vehicles, and the National
Automotive Dealers Association’s NADA Motorcycle
Appraisal Guide 1975–95 for motorcycles. The fol-
lowing assumptions were used in this analysis:
 Vehicles acquired new were assumed to have
been purchased at list price.
 Vehicles acquired used. The wholesale and retail
prices were obtained from the January issue of
the appropriate Blue Book or NADA Guide for
the estimated year of acquisition. Wholesale
prices are what dealerships pay to purchase
vehicles; retail prices are what consumers pay to
purchase vehicles from a dealership. Vehicles
sold between two private parties are typically
sold at a price halfway between the wholesale
and retail prices. Assuming that half of all used
vehicles are sold by dealerships and half are sold
directly by their owners, the purchase price of
used vehicles was estimated to be:
1⁄2 (retail + 1⁄2 (retail + wholesale)) (2)
 “Average” model prices. The NPTS defines vehi-
cle models more broadly than the Blue Book.
For example, the NPTS may identify a vehicle
only as a Ford Taurus, whereas the Blue Book
provides separate prices for the Taurus GL Sedan
and Wagon, SE Sedan, LX Sedan and Wagon,
and SHO Sedan. In these cases, prices were esti-
mated as the average of the high and low values
for all submodels within a model family.
 “Typical” options packages. The Blue Book
prices are based on standard packages of
options, determined by the vehicle’s class and
model year. All vehicles in this analysis were
assumed to have this typical package of options.
Using this methodology, we obtained initial
vehicle values for over 90% of the vehicles from
the NPTS California sample. Missing values were
most often due to missing data, such as incomplete
make or model information. In addition, we
excluded recreational vehicles and medium- and
heavy-duty trucks from the analysis because no
price guide was available for these vehicles (there
were fewer than 30 of these in the California sam-
ple). Finally, we excluded model years 1918
through 1964 because NPTS assigned all of these
to model year 1955 (there were fewer than 50 of
these in the California sample), preventing mean-
ingful value estimates.
The estimated purchase prices were compared
with findings published by the State of California’s
Legislative Analyst’s Office (1998). This compari-
son is shown in table 4. Overall, the data from the
NPTS-based estimation are consistent with the
Legislative Analyst’s report. The estimation based
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TABLE 4   Comparison of Initial Purchase
Price Estimates
Estimates Legislative
Purchase from NPTS Analyst’s
price & Blue Book Office (1998)
Less then $5,000 23% 27%
$5,000–9,999 23% 23%
$10,000–14,999 23% 19%
$15,000–19,999 18% 15%
$20,000–24,999 8% 8%
$25,000–29,999 2% 4%
$30,000–34,999 1% 2%
$35,000 and above 2% 2%
on the NPTS data has slightly fewer vehicles valued
at less than $5,000 and more vehicles valued
between $10,000 and $19,999. With the estimated
acquisition year and vehicle value, the 1996 VLF
for each vehicle was estimated using equation (1)
and the depreciation schedule in table 1.
The average VLF per automobile (including cars,
pickup trucks, vans, and sport utility vehicles) esti-
mated from the NPTS data was $136 in 1996. The
average for motorcycles was $55. The Legislative
Analyst’s report estimated the average automobile
VLF in 1997 as $171 and the average motorcycle
VLF as $57 (State of California 1998). The differ-
ence in the average automobile VLF may be due to
the fact that the NPTS data include only household
vehicles. The DMV data used for the Legislative
Analyst’s estimate include vehicles owned by busi-
nesses, including rental-car and other fleets. These
vehicles are likely to be newer, i.e., registered for
fewer years, and would incur a higher VLF. For
example, we estimated that the average VLF for
rental vehicles is $349 (Dill et al. 1999).
3. Estimate of Income Tax Deductions
Although the VLF is deductible from state and fed-
eral income taxes, relatively few taxpayers claim
this deduction. Nonetheless, because the tendency
to itemize tax deductions varies with income, it is
appropriate to estimate how this affects the actual
incidence of the tax.
Data supplied by the California Franchise Tax
Board (FTB) were used for this part of the analysis.
Based on the FTB’s weighted sample of 100,000
California tax returns, average marginal tax rates
and percentage of households itemizing deductions
for personal property tax payments were estimated
for each income group and filing status category.
This involved the following assumptions:
 Households vs. taxpayers. The data from the
FTB are a sample of taxpayers, not households.
This creates potential problems if we wish to
apply statistics from this sample to the house-
holds in our sample from the NPTS. First, some
households with more than one adult (e.g., non-
family households or married couples filing sep-
arately) may be overrepresented. In addition,
businesses filing tax returns are included in the
sample. Small businesses may comprise a large
proportion of the returns at lower income levels,
since low-income families are not required to
file if they do not owe taxes.
 Filing status. Average marginal tax rates vary
with the filing status (single, married filing joint-
ly, etc.) of the taxpayer. Because the NPTS does
not provide information on tax filing status,
household life cycle categories were used as a
proxy. Households with two or more adults
were assumed to file taxes as “married couples
filing jointly;” households with one adult and
no children were assumed to file as “single” tax-
payers; and households with one adult and one
or more children were assumed to file as “head
of household” taxpayers.
 Personal property tax deductions. Taxpayers
may deduct state “personal property taxes” on
their federal tax forms. For California residents,
the VLF is the most significant of these taxes.
We have assumed that all California taxpayers
itemizing deductions for personal property taxes
(about 16% of all filers) from their federal in-
come taxes included the VLF in the amount that
they deducted.
Based on these assumptions, the estimates for
average marginal tax rates and percentage of
households deducting personal property taxes
were applied to each household on the basis of
income and family life cycle. The estimated VLF
was adjusted as follows:
VLFadjusted = VLF  (1 – (% deducting VLF) 
(average marginal tax rate)) (3)
Potential Sources of Error
Systematic errors in our analysis may potentially
originate with the data themselves or with the
assumptions that we applied in using the data.
 Vehicle purchase dates. The assumption that
used vehicles were purchased halfway between
their model year and the survey year may sys-
tematically underestimate VLF charges for older
vehicles. Since cars built in the early 1970s were
all assumed to have been purchased more than
10 years prior to the survey date, they were all
assigned to the lowest VLF fee categories (15%
to 20%), whereas in reality, some of these vehi-
cles would have been purchased more recently.
 Used-vehicle values. The assumption that used-
vehicle values are a function of the Kelley Blue
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Book retail and wholesale values may systemati-
cally overestimate actual reported vehicle values.
This is because many used vehicles are not in the
“excellent” condition that corresponds to the
Blue Book prices and because some purchasers
of used vehicles may underreport vehicle sale
prices to evade the state sales tax and the VLF.
 New-vehicle values. The assumption that new
vehicles were purchased at list price may overes-
timate actual new vehicle values because some
dealerships may sell below list price. It also
masks price variations among vehicle submodels
and options packages.
 Tax deductions. Some taxpayers running busi-
nesses may deduct the VLF as a business expense
rather than as a personal property tax. These
deductions are not counted in our analysis.
 Company vehicles. An unknown percentage of
the vehicles in the sample are owned or leased
by an entity other than the household, such as
an employer. In many of these cases, the house-
hold does not pay the VLF directly or indirectly.
Therefore, VLF may be overestimated for high-
er income households that are more likely to use
company-owned vehicles.
The most important net effect of these errors is
expected to be the combination of assumptions
about vehicle purchase dates and vehicle values. In
each case, the use of “average” values is likely to
mask significant underlying income effects, leading
to more level (and therefore more regressive) esti-
mates of the relationship between income and VLF
than actually exist.
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